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S(!BSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS*
Edgar H. Ailes t

I
INTRODUCTION

I

T is perhaps the most inveterate doctrine of the conflict of laws that
all questions of procedure in a given instance are governed by the
lex f ori, or the law of the court invoked, regardless of the law under
which the substantive rights of the parties accrued. For seven centuries, at least, courts and lawyers have broadly stated or assumed to
be axiomatic the rule that substantive rights are fixed and immutable
whilst the procedural devices by which such rights may be vindicated
and enforced depend solely upon the law of the forum.
This doctrine has an unmistakable affinity to the traditional "vested
rights" interpretation of the conflict of laws.1 If it be true, as orthodox scholars maintain, that the court of the forum, in adjudicating a
"foreign" cause of action, recognizes it and enforces it by such machinery as it would apply in similar litigation of domestic origin, the distinction is at least plausible. 2 Thus, Dicey affirms without hesitation
that, "a court must recognize every right which it enforces, [but] it

* This article is a revised version of the first chapter of the writer's unpublished
thesis, "Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," submitted to the Board of
Faculty of Law at the University of Oxford in 1929, and now in the Bodleian Library.
Without committing them to approval of any of the views herein expressed, the writer
desires to acknowledge valuable criticism of the manuscript from Professor Joseph H.
Beale; from Professors Edgar N. Durfee, Burke Shartel, Hessel E. Yntema and John
P. Dawson of the Law School of the University of Michigan; and from Mr. Hugh B.
Cox of the bar of Washington, D. C.
A.B., J.D., Michigan; D. Phil., Oxford; member of the Detroit bar.-Ed.
1 Classic statements of the traditional view will be found in STORY, CoNFLICT OF
LAws, 8th ed.,§ 556 (1883); in DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 19 ff. (1927);
and in the opinions of Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican National R. R., 194 U. S.
120, 24 S. Ct. 58 I ( I 90 3), and of Justice Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
' 2 Dr. Hessel E. Yntema, reviewing Professor Goodrich's treatise, in "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," 37 YALE L. J. 468 at 478 (1928), says:
"Obviously, from the viewpoint of a consistent vested rights theory the distinction cannot be justified, and the difficulty is only stated by elaborating an intricate system of
rights, primary, secondary, and remedial, such as is adopted on page 158. Surely, on this
theory, a right which is once panoplied by the powers, privileges and immunities of a
given system of law ought to take with it that full panoply wherever it goes, if it is not
to become a disfigured ghost. And yet everyone knows that no such scheme will ever
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need not enforce every right which it recognizes." 8 Justice Holmes
made the same point with equal succinctness when he said: "A contract
valid where made is valid everywhere, but it is not necessarily enforceable everywhere." 4 And in a recent decision, Chief Justice Hughes
declared that
"The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the legal and
binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under no
duty to provide remedies through the courts, the contractual
obligation still exists and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign." 5
Now to a "realist" of the new school, the statements just quoted
are perfect nonsense. "A right," says Llewellyn, "is as big, precisely,
as what the courts will do." 6 This leads to the view that the court of
the forum must either frankly deny the existence of the claimed substantive right, or else see to it that the new substantive right created in
the forum has all the force and effect of its foreign prototype. To the
realist, an a priori distinction between substance and procedure is meaningless jargon; subject to possible limitations imposed by public policy,
he asserts that every rule of foreign law which bears materially upon
the interests of the parties should be freely imported. Thus, Professor
Lorenzen concludes that
"The terms 'substance' and 'procedure' have no inherent
meaning. They may mean one thing for purposes of constitutional
law and another thing for other local purposes. Whatever the
label that may be attached to a given matter from these two points
of view, there is no reason whatsoever why such labels should be
attachetj. to conflict of laws situations. If the legal relations bebe adopted this side of the millennium." Although this view is logically unassailable, it
seems rather arbitrary to assume that because the forum declines to adopt the foreign
law in all its minutiae, it necessarily emasculates the substantive right created by that law.
This point is the basis of the elementary rule that there can be no vested rights in
rules of procedure.
8
DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 26 (1927). Cf. deSloovere, "The .Local
Law Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws," 41 HARV. L. REv. 421 at
433 (1928).
4
Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326 at 327, 39 N. E. 1026 (1895). This point
was made by Paul Voet in the seventeenth century. SToRY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 8th ed.,
§ 632a (1883). "Non jus deficit, sed probatio," wrote the Roman jurist Paul. Quoted
2 PLANioL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, 6th ed., § 8 (1910).
5
Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 at 354, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935).
6
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 82 (1930).
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tween two parties are to be ascertained with reference to the law
of State X, the rights so created should be enforced by the courts
of other states, unless the local machinery would be obstructed
thereby; or, in an extreme case, if the enforcement or recognition
of such rights would be shocking to the local community. Whatever rules of State X bear substantially upon the rights of the
parties should be recognized and enforced, subject to the two
provisos above mentioned, without reference to the fact whether
the particular matter for purposes of constitutional law or local
law in the State of X or the state of the forum happens to be
labelled 'substantive' or 'procedural.'" 7
Llewellyn asserts that
"The differentiation between substantive law and adjective law
is an illusion, -although the prevalence of this illusion ( as of any
other) has results in human behavior, and must be taken account
of." 8
Another typical statement is that of Chamberlayne, who roundly declares:
"The distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory. In essence, there is none." 9
These quotations will suffice to make clear the nature of the existing controversy regarding the dualism of substance and procedure. To
the traditionalist, the distinction, if not "necessarily" true, is at least a
legitimate division of the elements in_ a cause and a useful tool in the
administration of justice. To the realist critic, the distinction is without
rational foundation, and it involves, in some cases, a denial of right
which is the more reprehensible in that it purports to rest upon a
"mere" denial of "remedy."
The law has borne more than its share of the modern attack upon
authority. The realist attitude toward the distinction between substance
and procedure exposes another facet of the prevailing contempt for
standards and general principles. The results of this contempt are
strikingly apparent today in the realms of ethics, aesthetics and politics, where expediency, opportunism and a kind of nebulous impressionism have superseded the dogmas of an older generation. Some writers
have gone so far as to hail the contemporary attitude as the true mark
7 In a letter to the writer, dated October 3 1, 1929, quoted with permission. To
the same effect is a note in 47 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1933).
8 LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BuSH 82-83 (1930). Cf. 50 HARV. L. REV. 1202
(1937), wherein the author rather cavalierly dismisses any distinction between substance
and procedure as "probably based on commonplace conceptions in the minds of judges."
9 I CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE, § 171 (19II).
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of intellectual and emotional maturity.10 The limitations of this attitude have been demonstrated with finality. 11 Nevertheless, the acclaim
which invariably greets such essentially negative and dogmatically antidogmatic books as Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind and
Thurman Arnold's The Folklore of Capitalism is a revealing evidence
of the zeitgeist. Whether we agree or disagree, the realist attitude is a
fact to be reckoned with and it has, undeniably, produced much of the
vital and significant legal literature of our time.
Quite the most valuable contribution yet made to this subject is
contained in a law review article by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook.12
His thesis is the relativity of legal terms-an insistence that such words
as "substance" and "procedure" have no fixed and permanent connotation, but that they may and do mean different things in different contexts.13 The basic problem, as Professor Cook phrases it, is this:
"If we admit that the 'substantive' shades off by imperceptible
degrees into the 'procedural,' and that the 'line' between them
does not 'exist,' to be discovered merely by logic and analysis, but
is rather to be drawn so as best to carry out our purpose, we see
that our problem resolves itself substantially into this: How far
1
° FRANK, LAw AND THE MoDERN MIND 16-17 (1930), argues that the
lawyer's predilection for order and stability is psychopathic and suggests that superior
men find "life's very insecurity ••• its most inviting aspect" and find "a deep enthusiastic bliss" in the absence of security. These words seem hardly appropriate to describe
the present state of mind of the American people, not counting the lawyers. In any
event, it must be clear that the attitude which Mr. Frank deems mature is too rare
both among lawyers and their clients to be of much practical importance. In a footnote,
Mr. Frank makes the gratifying concession that, "A completely adult attitude would
not involve undue stress on the value of chance." Cf. DEWEY, THE QuEST FOR CERTAINTY (1930).
11
Fuller, "American Legal Realism," 82 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 429 (1934); Pou.nd,
"Fifty Years of Jurisprudence," 51 HARV. L. REv. 777 (1938).
12
" 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L. J. 3 3 3
(1933). Professor David Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47
HARV. L. REv. 173 at 186 1933), declares that Professor Cook has "convincingly
revealed the inutility'' of the orthodox approach.
18
As Justice Holmes said in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 at 425, 38 S. Ct.
158 (1918), "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." The same point is often made in modern
aesthetic criticism. Thus, Ernest Newman, in the Sunday Times (London) of Feb. 19,
1933, says of Furtwangler, the German conductor, that "he has no idea of the relativity
of dynamic markings. The same sign may mean one thing in one work or one species of
music and quite a different thing in another; no conductor with any sense of proportion, or any fine feeling for the inner nerve of music, would interpret the marking
pianissimo in the same way in the 'Gotterdammerung' and in 'L'Apres midi d'un
Faune.'"
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can the court of the forum go in applying the rules taken from
the foreign system of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself?" 14
Professor Cook is much more guarded in· his criticism than most of the
new empiricists. Although insisting that the categories of substance
and procedure are not absolute, he concedes that they are not to be less
respected on that account. He admits the utility of the classificatio:U
and seeks only to delimit the sphere of its application. And he forestalls adverse criticism by disavowing his apparent nominalism and
hostility to logic.15
It seems proper, nevertheless, to infer from the article just quoted
that, in conflict of laws cases, Professor Cook favors the importation
into the forum of every rule of foreign law which has a material bearing upon the rights of the parties, unless it would unduly inconvenience
the forum so to do. One may accept Professor Cook's postulates and
admire the acuteness of his argument without assenting to such a program. From this standpoint, I propose, in the following pages, to
review the history of the distinction between substance and procedure,
to attempt an estimate of its role in the decision of conflicts cases and
a determination of its value as an instrument of social policy.

II
HISTORY

Whether the Digest of Justinian is of any direct value to the
modern student of the conflict of laws is a question upon which high
authority is divided,16 but there is certainly no formulation in the
Digest of the capital distinction now under consideration. If not of
medieval origin, the distinction at least became established in medieval
times.
In 1265, in a case before the Parlement of Paris, the defendant
offered an excuse for non-appearance, in English terminology, an
14 Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L. J.
333 at 343-344 (1933).
15 Id., 42 YALE L. J. 333 at 357.
16 I P1LLET, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 22 (1923),
although steeped in Roman law, finds Justinian's compilation of no value to the modern
student of the conflict of laws, while BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 18-24 (1916), and
1 PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CusToM oF ANCIENT GREECE AND
RoME, c. XII (1911), are of a contrary opinion.
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"essoin," asserting that the "custom of Normandy" allowed it. The
defendant's contention was overruled on the ground that the matter
was "de processu causae" and was therefore governed by the lex fori. 11
Further evidence of the antiquity of the distinction is afforded by
an interesting passage in the works of Pierre de Belleperche ( a French
contemporary of Bracton), who died in r308:
"Les docteurs distinguent, et j e suis de leur avis. Ou bien il
s'agit de his quae ordinationem litis respiciunt, et alors la coutume
a suivre est celle qui regne au lieu du litige. Par exemple, moi,
Orleanais, j'attaque un Parisien devant le juge de Chartres; la
coutume de Paris est que l'assignation soit donnee par ecrit; la
coutume de Chartres est contraire; c'est celle-ci qui sera appliquee.
Ou bien il s'agit de his quae f aciunt ad litis decisionem. Par exemple, quelqu'un m'a vendu un cheval; je lui demande, a titre
de garantie et conformement a la coutume de mon pays, des
gages ou des :fidejusseurs; il refuse, parce que, dans son pays,
ces sfu-etes sont inconnues. Les docteurs disent qu'il ne faut considerer ni la coutume du domicile du defendeur, ni celle du
domicile du demandeur, ni celle du lieu ou se debat le proces,
17 I LES OuM, ed. Beugnot, 630 (1839). "Petebat Gilebertus Malesmains, miles,
habere per bursam quamdam terram quam Richardus Goelons emerat a domino Alano
de Avalgor, tanquam heres propinquior venditoris, quod offerebat se probaturum, si
sibi negaretur. Ad hoc respondebat dictus Richardus quod idem Gilebertus super hoc non
debebat audiri, cum non venisset ad hoc petendum infra annum et diem, a tempore
empcionis predicte, quod offerebat se probaturum si sibi negaretur: Tandem, dicto
Gileberto hoc negante, lite in hac curia contestata, et juramento super hoc a partibus
facto, quesitum fuit ab ipso Richardo quomodo vellet hoc probare, qui se obtulit
hoc probaturum per recordacionem assisie Constancie, in qua fuit saisitus, et homagium
fecit de terra predicta, sicut dicebat. Postmodum, die prefixa ad recordacionem in hac
curia faciendam, ad usus et consuetudines Normannie, dicto Richardo presente cum
testibus suis, quos producebat, dictus Gilebertus contramandavit, quod facere poterat,
ad usus et consuetudines Normannie, sicut dicebatur pro ipso. Ad hoc dicebat dictus
Richardus quod non debebat recipi ad usus et consuetudines hujus curie in qua lis fuit
contestata, cum hoc sit de processu cause, et processus cause debeat deduci ad usus hujus
curie? propter quod recipi testes suos petebat et recordacionem suam currere, vel jus
utrum deberet fieri, cum in fraudem contramandaverit idem Gilebertus, et ut recordacionem suam possit eidem subtrahere, sicut dicebat: Demum, auditis hinc inde propositus,
licet in Normannia posset dictus Gilebertus semel contramandare in hoc casu, ad usus
Normannie, sicut quidam dicebant, quia tamen hujus contramandacio est de processu
causae que hie fuit contestata, et cause debent in hac curia tractari ad usus hujus curie,
dictum fuit, per jus, quod non reciperetur contramandacio ipsius Gileberti in hoc casu,
et quod reciperetur recordacio ipsius Richardi, et fuit recepta hie ad usus Normannie, et
fuit pro dicto Richardo."
Concerning essoins, see 2 PoLLOCK and MAITLAND, THE H1sToRY oF ENGLISH
LAW 560-561 (1895).
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a celle du lieu ou le contrat s'est effec-

18

In the fourteenth century the post-glossators Bartolus and Baldus
laid down the same distinction with equal clarity.19 In the sixteenth,
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was recognized as a settled
rule by the most influential European writers. 20 These jurists usually
differentiated ea quae ad litis decifionem pertinent from ea quae ad
litis ordinationem pertinent; the difference survives in modern French
law as formes decisoires and formes ordinatoires-a rather misleq.ding
terminology.
The principal modern authorities are no less definite in stating the
distinction as fundamental and axiomatic. 21
The date at which English courts accepted the distinction cannot
be fixed with precision. That it was acted upon before it was explicitly
stated we know from a judgment rendered in 1705, in which the Court
of Chapcery applied the English statute of limitations in a suit upon
18

Quoted,

1

LAINE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE

121

(1888).
19 The writings of Bartolus on the conflict of laws are reprinted in Guthrie's
English translation of the eighth volume of SAvIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RoMIscHEN REcHTS. An English translation of Bartolus was made by Professor Beale in
1914 and published by the Harvard University Press. See § 15 of that edition. For
Baldus, see I LAINE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 121 (1888).
20
STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 8th ed., §§ 560, 561 (1883), quotes Rodenburg,
Hertius and Strykius to this effect. Dumoulin's statement of the distinction is quoted in
l BouLLENOis, TRAITE DE LA PERSONALITE ET DE LA REALITE DES Lmx, obs. 23
(1766), and approved by the author. Huber is quoted in Guthrie's English translation
of 8 SAvIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RoMISCHEN RECHTS, 2d ed., Appendix, p. 512
(1880). See also l EMERIGON, TRAITE DES AssuRANCEs, c. 4, p. 122 (1783).
21
2 KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Holmes 12th ed.,* 462 (1873);
2 BuRGE, CoLONIAL AND FoREIGN LAw, new ed., 40 (1908); 4 PmLLIMORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 3d ed., c. XLV (1889); 2 'WHARTON, CoNFLJCT OF LAws, 3d ed.,§ 747
(1905); FooTE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed., 542 (1925); D1cEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 4th ed., 798 (1927); STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 8th ed., § 556
(1883); MrnoR, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 205 (1901); GooDRicH, CoNFLICT OF LAws,
2d ed., § 77 (i938); 3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 584.1 (1935); STOMBERG,
CoNFLICT OF LAws 128 (1937); I FoEux, TRAITE DU DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE,
4th ed., 275 (1866); 8 LAURENT, LE DROIT C1VIL INTERNATIONAL 41 (1881);
2 MASSE, LE DROIT CoMMERCIAL, 3d ed., § 760; BRoCHER, NouvEAu TRAJTE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 281 (1876); l LAINE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, 121 (1888); DESPAGNET, Pric1s DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIVE, 2d ed., § 271 (1890); 5 WEiss, TRA1ri THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 443-444 (1905); SuRVILLE, CouRs ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, 7th ed., 660-675 (1925); VALERY, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 734 (1914); l P1LLET, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE IIS (1923).
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a foreign obligation. 22 Two and a half centuries earlier than this, in a
notable case reported in the Year Books, the question provoked a
remarkable argument. 23 In an action of debt brought in the King's
Court, the plaintiff sought to recover for board furnished by him to
the defendant. Littleton, in behalf of the defendant, attempted a
"wager of law" that nothing was owing to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's
counsel replied that, according to the custom of the city of London,
"in an action of debt where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant owes
him for his table, the defendant does not wage his law." To this Littleton rejoined:
"That is no plea to oust us of our wager of law for he has
alleged nothing to oust us of our wager of law except a custom of
the City of London which is to no purpose in this court; and I
offer a distinction between cases where the custom will bind and
will be allowed in all courts and where only in the court of the
town or city where the custom is alleged."
The ensuing argument, which ends with an exasperating, "Quaere well
concerning this matter," does, nevertheless, make it quite clear that
the warring advocates had grasped the distinction which we now put
in terms of substance and procedure, and sought their clients' advantage in the importation into or exclusion from the royal forum of a
procedural rule of the London civic courts. In Robinson v. Bland/A.
decided in r760, Justice Wilmot declared that persons appealing to
English courts for redress must take their remedy according to the law
of England. A Scotch lawyer, Lord Karnes, whose Principles of Equity
was published in the middle of the eighteenth century, announced the
distinction as the result of his deliberations, without reference to any
authority. 25 Not until the last decade of the century was the distinction clearly formulated by English courts and consciously applied in
conflict of laws cases. 26
The reasons for this tardy recognition by English courts of a doctrine accepted on the continent in Bracton's time are not far to seek.
England, being a legal unit, naturally had no internal conflicts of law
of the sort which commonly arose in Italy, France and the Netherlands. Furthermore, her geographical isolation long impeded the free
intercourse which gives rise to litigation. Then there were jurisdicDupleix v. De Roven, 2 Vern. 540, 23 Eng. Rep. 950 (1705).
Year Book 1 Edw. IV, Mich. pl. 13 (1460).
24 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760).
25 KAM ES, PRINCIPLES oF EQUITY, 2d ed., bk. 3, c. 8, § 4, p. 3 58 ( l 767).
26 See Melan v. Duke de Fitzjames, I Bos. & P. 138, 126 Eng. Rep. 822 (1797).
22

23
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tional technicalities: since a writ would not run to summon a witness
or juror from abroad, it was theoretically impossible to prove foreign
facts. 27 Finally, the jurisdiction of the King's courts, in certain actions,
was based upon a breach of the King's peace; and, as this was a jurisdictional fact, the tort, including the breach of the peace, had to be laid
as occurring within the kingdom. This obstacle was not overcome until
1774 when, in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,28 a fictitious non-traversable allegation of venue within the kingdom was allowed.
Even after English courts were free to entertain foreign suits, such
cases were rare and were approached with trepidation. Thus, as late
as 1825, Best, C. J., in the course of a rather befuddled opinion, held
that a contract made in England was governed by English law, although performable abroad, and added, "These questions of international law do not often occur." 29
It is a safe generalization that the history of the conflict of laws in
England reveals a steady encroachment of foreign law upon the field
originally allotted to the lex fori. The early English cases seem naively
to have regarded the lex fori as the only one which could possibly be
considered-an assumption which Lord Mansfield shattered with
characteristic vigor:
"There can be no doubt, but that every action tried here must
be tried by the law of England; but the law of England says, that
in a variety of instances, with regard to contracts legally made
abroad, the law of the country where the cause of action arose
shall govern." so
We may, therefore, properly ascribe the dearth of early English
authority to geographical isolation and procedural technicalities, and
not, as the Count de Vareilles-Sommieres quaintly surmises, to the
discourtesy of Englishmen towards foreigners. 81
In the American colonies, conflict of laws cases naturally arose at an
early date. In 1648, the General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay allowed an action for a battery committed in England. 82 In
1799 it was held in New York that the question whether the assignee
21 Beale, "The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreig~ers," 26 HARV. L. REv. 283
at 289 (1913).
28 l Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774).
29 Arnott v. Redfern, 2 Carr. & P. 88 at 90, 172 Eng. Rep. 40 (1825).
80 Holman v. Johnson, l Cowp. 341 at 343, 98 Eng. Rep. II20 (1775).
81 2 VAREILLEs-SoMMIEREs, LA SYNTHESE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 3 70
(1897).
82 2 MASSACHUSETTS CoLoNIAL RECORDS, 1642-1649, p. 255 (1853), cited by
Beale, "Jurisdiction over Foreigners," 26 HARV. L. REV. 283 at 290 (1913).
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of a chose in action should sue in his own name was a question of procedure, and, as such, governed by the lex fori. 33 In 1792, a federal
court, sitting in North Carolina, rejected the Maryland rule regarding
joinder of co-obligors which was pleaded and applied the lex fori; the
report states that "Patterson, Circuit Justice, took a distinction between
the contract and the remedy." 34 In subsequent cases, although it is
apparent that the labels "substantive" and "procedural" have often
been affixed with an eye to the result sought, apparently no court has
repudiated the basic distinction or even expressed doubts as to its validity. The easy and obvious solution of ignoring all foreign law and considering only the lex fori seems never to have been considered in
modern times. The explanation doubtless lies in factors of justice and
convenience which dictate that the substantial rights of persons-especially those engaged in international trade and commerce-be not
exposed to the hazards or unknown requirements of foreign laws. 85

III
MEANING AND SERVICEABILITY oF THE DISTINCTION

What, then, do we mean by "substance" and "procedure"? Eminent lawyers have expended much ingenuity upon the subject, and
some of the results are set forth in a footnote on this page. 36 With all
deference, it is submitted that these definitions afford little help; they
simply replace one unknown by another. What avails it to know that
a distinction is taken between rights which create and those which
enforce or protect? Who can think more clearly or decide a case more
fairly upon a division of rules into those which affect the result directly
and those which do not? One must agree with Professor Cook that:
"Every attempt to reduce the law in a given field to a rule which
can be applied automatically to really new situations by the procLodge v. Phelps, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 139 (1799).
Palyart v. Goulding, (C. C. N. C. 1792) 18 F. Cas. No. 10701.
35
See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 3 (1916); DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws,
4th ed., 8 (1927).
36 "The law of procedure may be defined as that branch of the law which governs
the process of litigation. It is the law of actions---jus quod ad actiones pertinet-using
the term action in a wide sense to include all legal proceedings, civil or criminal. All
the residue is substantive law, and relates, not to the process of litigation, but to its
purpose and subject-matter. . .. So far as the administration of justice is concerned
with the application of remedies to violated rights, we may say that the substantive law
defines the remedy and the right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and
conditions of the application of the one to the other." SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 7th
ed.,§ 172, pp. 495-496, 497 (1924).
33
34
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esses of deductive logic, is of necessity foredoomed to failure. In
the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, 'But certainty generally is
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.'" 87
Our most obvious difficulty lies in the fact that many rules of modern substantive law had their origin in procedural devices. "Bracton
has fifty times as much on actions as he has on the law of persons, and
it is under this head that we must search in his pages for much of
what we now call substantive law." 88 It is a truism that the praetor at
" 'Substance' •.• denotes the rules that determine the legal relations when all of
the facts have been made known to the court; 'procedure' concerns the process by
which the facts are made known." Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 308 at 310 (1924).
"Substantive law is canonized procedure. Procedure is unfrocked substantive law."
Professor Thurman Arnold, "The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process," 45 HARV. L. REv. 617 at 645 (1932).
"Now the law consists of two distinct and almost independent sets of rules or
principles, one making up the field of so-called substantive law, the other the field of
procedure. The first group is primary and constitutes an essential part of the structure
of society; the second is secondary and derivative, and merely serves to make the first
operative. The first group is relatively fixed, and only changes with the slow evolution
of social relations; the second is relatively flexible, having no universal quality but being
the mere manifestations of opportunist ingenuity. To radically revise the first would
mean a social revolution, but the second could be totally reorganized at a moment's
notice without causing a tremor in the social structure. While the safety and security
of civilization may be said to require stability in the first group, safety and security
can be realized only by elasticity in the second. The distinction here made is not
absolute but only relative. . .. Nevertheless, this distinction between the substantive
law and the form of its operative activity is valid." Professor Edson Sunderland, "An
Inquiry Concerning the Functions of Procedure in Legal Education," 29 W. VA. L. Q.
77 at 86-87 (1923).
"English lawyers give the widest possible extension to the meaning of the term
'procedure.' The expression, as interpreted by our Judges, includes all legal remedies,
and everything connected with the enforcement of a right. It covers, therefore, the
whole field of practice; it includes the whole law of evidence, as well as every rule
in respect to the limitation of an action or of any other legal proceedings for the
enforcement of a right, and hence it further includes the methods, e.g., seizure of
goods or arrest of person, by which a judgment may be enforced.'' DICEY, CoNFLICT OF
LAws, 4th ed., 798-799 (1927).
"Les formes decisoires sont celles qui, se rattachant au fond du litige, exercent
une influence directe sur la solution qui doit lui etre donnee (quae faciunt ad Uti.r
decisionem); elles resortissent a la loi qui regit le droit conteste lui-meme. Les formes
ordinatoires sont celles qui, etrangeres au fond de la contestation qu'il s'agit d'apprecier,
et a la decision qu'elle appelle, sont uniquement relatives a la marche et au developpement de !'instance engagee (quae ordinationem litis respiciunt). Ces formes sont du
domaine de la lex fori; la lex fori seule peut !es prescrire et leur assurer une sanction.''
5 WE1ss, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DRmT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 443-444
(1905).
37 Cook, "The Present Status of the 'Lack of Mutuality' Rule," 36 YALE L. J.
897 at 912 (1927).
38 3 STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY I (1906).
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Rome and the chancellor in England worked fundamental changes in
substantive law through their control of the remedial machinery. A
familiar example is the gradual transition from the view that the
cestui que trust had only a right of action against the trustee, to the
view that he was the owner of the trust res. 89 Justice Holmes illustrated the point in a Massachusetts decision:
"The rule that, if a man abuse an authority given him by the
law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, although now it looks like
a rule of substantive law and is limited to a certain class of cases,
in its origin was only a rule of evidence by which, when such
rules were few and rude, the original intent was presumed conclusively from the subsequent conduct." 40
The same judge has traced the interesting metamorphosis of the
rule that a bailee was liable because he could sue into the rule that he
could sue because he was liable.41 One cannot, indeed, improve upon
Maine's remark that, "So great is the ascendency of the Law of Actions
in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the
look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure." 42'
And this apparently was the thought of Chancellor Kent when he wrote
that, "Forms will frequently, and especially when they are consecrated
by time and usage, become substance." 48
From a logical standpoint, it is, of course, improper to speak of
remedies as existing anterior to substantive rights. The one necessarily
involves the other. A substantive right is "only the hypostasis of a
prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that the
public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to
contravene it." 44 Furthermore, there is clearly nothing inevitable in
the differentiation of right and remedy. In the long history of Roman
law, right and remedy were never sharply dissociated, and there is no
evidence that Roman justice was any the worse on that account. Maine
concluded that, "on the whole, the Romans must be considered to have
constructed their memorable legal system without the help of the conDean Pound in a book review, 26 HARV. L. REv. 462 at 463 (1913).
200 (1896).
41 HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAw 167 (1881).
~ MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1886).
48 Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 239 at 245 (1810).
44 HOLMES, "Natural Law'' in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 at 313 (1920),
reprinted from 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 at 42 (1918).
89
4

°Commonwealth v. Rubin, 165 Mass. 453 at 455, 43 N. E.
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ception of legal Right." 45 There is something to· be said for the view
that legal analysis and classification have done as much harm as good.
Further confusion is engendered by the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium. The necessary coexistence of substantive right and procedure for
its enforcement is a very popular notion. Thus, it is often asserted by
laymen and lawyers that a right without a remedy is a contradiction in
terms, i.e., no right at all. 46 Such statements have about them an air of
blunt common sense which is very seductive. We are certainly justified
in assuming that a right without any means of redress would be a vain
and hollow thing. The right to recover possession of land from a wrongful occupant would be small consolation to a disseized owner if the
legislature should abolish all remedies: ejectment, trespass q.c.f., selfhelp, etc. A court fee of $1,000,000 for initiating a lawsuit, although
procedural in form, would annihilate virtually all substantive rights.
In the light of these factors, shall we conclude that the distinction
between substance and procedure which lawyers have been attempting
to draw for seven centuries is irrational and illusory and that it should
be abandoned as an outmoded shibboleth? I think not, for several reasons. First, let us consider the purely intellectual significance of the
distinction without regard to its practical consequences. It seems a
reasonable conjecture that the distinction is referable to a fundamental
habit of the human mind. Is it not a natural application to law of such
distinctions as men have drawn from time immemorial between substance and form, between essence and accident, between the One and
45 MAINE, EARLY LAw AND CusToM 365-366 (1886). Cf. BucKLAND, TEXTBOOK
oF RoMAN LAW 58-59 (1921); JoLowrcz, HrSTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF RoMAN LAw 421-422 (1932).
46
Thus Lord Holt in Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 at 953, 92 Eng. Rep.
126 (1703): "If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate
and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it;
and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for want of right and
want of remedy are reciprocal." Thus, l BAcoN, ABRIDGMENT, "Actions in General,"
B (1736): "It is clear, that for all injuries done to a man's person, reputation or
property, he shall have an action, and that for every right he is to have a remedy;
for want of right and want of remedy are the same thing." Thus AMES, LECTURES
ON LEGAL HISTORY 199 (1913): "An immortal right to bring an eternally prohibited
action is a metaphysical subtlety that the present writer cannot pretend to understand."
Cf. Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. St. 260 (1857), and Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16
at 26, 25 N. E. 312 (1890). Yet the notion that a debt may survive the extinction
of all remedies for its direct enforcement is not peculiar to Anglo-American law and it
affords a rational basis for the innumerable cases which attach legal consequences to
rights which are no longer cognizable directly in the courts. And in conflict of laws
cases one cannot accurately affirm that to deny the remedy is to deny the right, since
some or all other states may give relief in the particular instance.
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the Many, between the constant and the variable, between the eternal
and the transitory?
"Undoubtedly the word substance suggests permanence rather
than change, because the substances best known to man (like the
milk and the wet sand of the young architect) evidently pass from
place to place and from form to form while retaining their continuity and quantity. Such permanence is not contrary to flux, but
a condition of flux." 47
By the same token, the word procedure suggests variation and permutation. Here the question is "how" and not "what," the means, not the
end. 48
In other words, may not the legal dichotomy of substance and procedure represent another form of the dualistic approach which is traditional in philosophy? It seems to evidence the natural striving of
man for some kind of totality of view-a clarifying vision of the whole
rather than a mere sympathetic response to the multifariousness of individual cases.
"This implication of unity in diversity is the scandal of reason, and
philosophers have, for the most part, ever since the Greeks, been
seeking with the aid of reason to abstract the unity from diversity, or else, by similar rationalizing processes, to stress the
diversity at the expense of the unity. Practically all the philosophers who now have the 'cry' belong, it is scarcely necessary to
add, to the latter class." 49

In opposition to the contemporary attitude, I venture to urge that
the lawyer's concepts of substance and procedur~, although not "inevit47

SANTAYANA, THE REALM OF MATTER 15 (1930). In propounding this explanation, I do not mean to imply that the philosophic concepts of substance and procedure
were deliberately employed by early lawyers in deciding a particular case. From an
etymological standpoint, philosophic usage may account for the lawyer's use of the
words substance and procedure, but the first cases applying the distinction doubtless
turned upon some more rough and ready basis. I intend rather to suggest that it seems
to be an ineradicable habit of the human mind to classify and coordinate and to seek
elements of constancy amid the phenomenal flux. Cf. ALDOUS HUXLEY, ENDS AND
MEANS 13 (1937), and W. MAcNEILE DIXON, THE HuMAN SITUATION, c. IX (1938).
48
DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CoNDUCT 34, 36 (1922), says: "The 'end' is
merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and a means is merely the series viewed
at an earlier one. The distinction of means and end arises in surveying the course of a
proposed line of action, a connected series in time .•.• Means and ends are two names
for the same reality. The terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction in
judgment."
49
BABBITT, DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP 146 (1924).
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able," are tools of value in legal thinking, and that they involve a
proper distinction in judgment. There is no "necessity" for a distinction
between poetry and prose; yet we apprehend a.difference and the admitted difficulty of stating it precisely affords no adequate reason for
eliminating the words from our vocabulary. By the same token there is
no indefectible line between infancy and maturity, yet common sense
suggests the utility of classifying human beings as children and adults
and one should be able to do so without subjecting himself to a charge
of naYvete or blind conceptualism. In the words of Professor Norman
Foerster:

"If words are not more or less arbitrary labels for things and ideas
and the relationship of things and ideas, all language is pure
nonsense. . .. No doubt the truth an sich is hopelessly elusive, but
the attainment of provisional or human truth is the reward of
courage and labour. We cannot afford to shirk-the task of achieving a reasonably clear and consistent terminology, even though
every definition is by nature an affirmation that tends to shut out
some portion of absolute truth. Whenever words become too hard
and exclusive, humanism is concerned with reconsidering their
frontiers; but whenever, as today, they become so vague as to
imperil human communication, humanism aims to achieve a clear
relation of labels to thought." no
The lawyer's distinction between substance and procedure is of the
kind just considered. Fortunately, we need not choose between the
rock of an inflexible rule and the whirlpool of no rule at all. We need
not formulate an infallible definition of either substance or procedure.
In deciding cases we can adopt the rule that procedural questions will
be reserved to the lex f ori without being enslaved by it. In dealing
with rules, "The intelligent alternative is to revise, adapt, expand and
alter them. The problem is one of continuous, vital readaptation." ai
The modern empirical approach to law often ignores these considerations and, in consequence, appears to be extreme and one-sided. Like
so much contemporary criticism, it suffers from an obsessional preoccupation with the abnormal and the pathological case. Bertrand
Russell, in this vein, points out several possible meanings when we
call a man "Peter," but the legal pragmatist will do well to note Russell's significant conclusion that the "fleeting particular occurrences"
GO

ai

Editorial Preface, HUMANISM AND AMERICA xv (1930).
DEWEY, HuMAN NATURE AND CoNDUCT 240 (1922).
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which make up Peter are bound together by a unity which justifies us
in putting them into a single category. 52
We cannot banish categories and concepts. They are tools of thought
which find their raison d'etre in the limitations of the human mind.
Their danger-upon which the legal realists have properly, if somewhat clamantly, insisted-lies in the assumption that these man-made
devices have an eternal, animate existence. Although it is doubtless
true, as Heraclitus remarked, that one cannot step twice into the same
river, it is absurd to deny that the river follows a well-charted course.
The argument that there can be no valid standards by which to judge
the "infinite otherwiseness" of things, that those who seek such standards are pursuing phantoms, is purely negative. It may be that we are
not yet ready-that we shall never be ready-for a perfect synthesis,
but it is certain that the human mind will not long rest content without
some effort to bring order out of the chaos of "fleeting particular
occurrences." As Justice Cardozo has said: "Exactness may be impossible, but that is not enough to cause the mind to acquiesce in a predestined incoherence." 58
It is submitted, then, that there are certain types of legal rights
which have enough in common to justify us in calling them "substantive" and, by the same token, certain other types of legal rights which
we may fairly group together and label "procedural." Here, as elsewhere in the law, "lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and
contact of decisions on the opposing sides." 54 This distinction is not
drawn a priori; it is not an "eternal verity," existent "in the nature
of things"; but it has the same "validity"-no more and no less--{ls
our distinctions between nouns and adjectives, poetry and prose, day
and night~ children and adults, drunkenness and sobriety, classic and
romantic, liberal and conservative. 55 In the words of Justice Holmes:
RUSSELL, PHILOSOPHY 53 (1927).
CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 3 (1928).
54 Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 at II2, 31 S.
Ct. 186 (1911).
55 WILLIAMSON, THE PoETRY OF T. S. ELIOT 24 (1932), says: "The division
of literary works into 'classic' and 'romantic' has been deplored. Admittedly, it is an
over-simplification, corresponding to the political division of Conservative and Liberal
which contains many easily-detected anomalies. The right wing Liberal, for instance-the Whig-is much more conservative than the Tory-Democrat and is actually closer
to his Die-Hard antagonists than to the Radicals of his own party. So in recent English
poetry, the last great romantic, Elroy Flecker, by his enthusiasm for the Parnassians,
betrayed definite classical leanings, while the first great classicist, T. S. Eliot, by his
attachment to the symbolists, is not altogether free from romanticism. Such considerations certainly suggest a case for the abolition of labels. It is a worthy argument except
52
58
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"the line which is drawn must be justified by the fact that it is
a little nearer than the nearest opposing case to one pole of an
admitted antithesis. When a crime is made burglary by the fact
that it was committed thirty seconds after one hour after sunset,
ascertained according to mean time in the place of the act, to take
an example from Massachusetts ... the act is a little nearer to
midnight than if it had been committed one minute earlier, and no
one denies that there is a difference between night and day. The
fixing of a point when day ends is made inevitable by the admission of that difference." 56
The antithesis must, then, be admitted; by denying it one loses the
sense of achieved distinction which is a valuable intuition. 57

IV
PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE DISTINCTION

Even though it be true that the distinction between substance and
procedure is historically venerable, is deeply rooted in intellectual habit
and affords a servicable classification, it must stand or fall by its practical operation. This brings us again to Professor Cook's argument. It
is apparently his contention that the courts, through hypocrisy or selfdeception, often deny the substantive rights which they profess to
"recognize," thereby doing violence to both theory and litigant. With
his usual ingenuity and felicity of illustration, Professor Cook elaborates upon several legal situations in which rules of law that are
ostensibly or usually denominated "procedural" are shown to strike at
the very root of the substantive right. With all ,deference, this seems
to be "launching a platitude with the fury of a thunderbolt." ls it not
evident that every rule of procedure may, in certain circumstances,
vitally affect substantive rights? ls. it not impossible to conceive of a
rule of procedure which, in a particular setting, may not bring success
or failure to the litigant?
If the forum refuses to allow a ne exeat,. or if it declines to hear
that it can end only in the admission of the simple fact that every poet has his individual idiosyncrasies. The broad division remains necessary, after all."
56 Dissenting, in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 at 631-632, 26 S. Ct.
525 (1906).
57 "Since all progress of mind consists for the most part in differentiation, in the
resolution of an obscure and complex subject into its component aspects, it is surely
the stupidest of losses to confuse things which right reason has put asunder, to lose the
sense of achieved distinctions ..••" Walter Pater, "Essay on Style," APPRECIATIONS 1
(1889).
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witnesses who have been convicted of crime, or if it compels a plaintiff
to give security for costs, it may and frequently does deny any relief
at all. The availability of service by publication or of capias ad respondendum is practically decisive of many lawsuits. Yet it is doubtful
whether the most extreme "realist" would assert that such things re-·
late to the substance of a party's case. And it seems forced and unreal
to argue that because A and B have made a contract in Michigan,
where the statutes permit garnishment before judgment, every court in
which the contract may subsequently be sued upon must allow that
remedy so long as it "pretends" to enforce a Michigan contract. The
element of fairness to parties who have relied upon a particular rule
of foreign law seems wholly lacking in these instances.
Professor Cook suggests that since the forms of pleadings have no
material bearing upon substantive rights, such matters are properly and
universally submitted to the lex fori. 58 Even in this field, however, it
is not fanciful to suppose that substantive rights may be affected. For
example, it was long the law of Michigan that
"No special plea in bar shall be pleaded in any civil action
hereafter to be commenced; but all matters of defense to any such
action may be given in evidence under the general issue." 59
The 1933 Michigan Court Rules made the following change:
"The general issue is abolished, and answers shall be used
wherever pleas have been employed in actions at law. . .. Every
answer shall contain an explicit admission or denial of each allegation in the declaration or bill of complaint as to which the defendant has knowledge or belief. . .. In connection with every
denial, the answer shall set forth the substance of the matters
which will be relied upon to support such denial." 60
No practicing lawyer is likely to underrate the importance of this
change. A defendant is now required, at the beginning of a case, to
disclose all his defenses and the evidence upon which they are based.
The tactical advantage of surprise which must have determined thousands of lawsuits is now, in theory at least, abolished.
68
Cook, " 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L. J.
333 at 346 (1933). Cf. the remarks of Judge Learned Hand in Aktieselskabet Korn-Og
Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, (D. C. N. Y. 1916) 232 F.
403 at 40 5-406: "In one sense everything which touches the remedy touches the obligation, since the only sanction to performance rests in the remedy, but that is the speech
of philosophers, not of lawyers, among whom the distinction has arisen and is real."
69
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 14126.
60
Michigan Court Rules (1933), Rule 23.
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It should be emphasized that the courts have found difficult only
the borderline cases and that the "confusion~' upon which certain realists insist,61 is, properly speaking, a conflict of authority~ The "mine
run" of cases point unmistakably in one direction or the other; really
new situations are rare and it is those situations which usually reach
appellate tribunals. A reference to some of the leading cases will emphasize these points. Even among such cases, examples of incongruity
or of analytical difficulty are not often found.
It is universally held, for example, that the availability of arrest
for debt depends upon the lex fori/ 2 and, with equal unanimity, the
courts regard the validity of a contract as a substantive question to be
determined by the "proper law." 63 Where the case is a close one, the
courts may generally be counted upon to face the situation very realistically, no matter what sacrifice of elegantia juris is involved.
Thus, the reader will recall that although a general statute of
limitations is usually regarded as declaring a rule of procedure, when
a limitation is contained in a statute creating a new substantive right
( e.g., Lord Campbell's Act) the limitation is invariably held to be
substantive.6 In other words, the courts regard right and remedy as
inextricably intertwined in such cases. Similarly, it is the prevailing
view that workmen's compensation cases must be heard in the courts
of the state enacting the statute, the apparent reason being that the
divorce of right and remedy in such cases is simply not feasible. 65
But perhaps the most striking illustration of this tendency is
afforded by a recent New York case, Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. 85
This was an action for personal injuries -sustained in Ontario. An Ontario statute provided that in any action for negligently inflicted injuries, if contributory negligence were established, the judge or jury
4,

61 E.g., the writer of a note in 4 7 HARV, L. REv. 3 1 5 ( I 930), who avers that the
distinction "results only in a confusing contrariety of decisions."
, 62 De la Vega v. Vianna, I B. & Ad. 284, 109 Eng. Rep. 792 (1830); Sturges
v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 122 at 200 (1819); Schwann v. Klug, (Cours
d'Appel, Paris) Sirey 1849.2.32, Dalloz 1849.2.98.
68 GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 107 (1938). There is, of course,
conflict as to w}iat the "proper law" is, e.g., the lex loci contractus, the lex loci solutionis
or the law intended by the parties.
6 4, GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 83 (1938). The cases are discussed
by the present writer in "Limitations of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 3 I Mica.
L. REV. 474 at 495-497 (1933).
65 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 2d ed., 244 (1938).
66 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112 (1929), noted in 43 HARV. L. REv. 1134
(1930) and in 39 YALE L. J. 901 (1930). Accord: Olson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry.,
131 Neb. 94, 267 N. W. 246 (1936). Contra: Midland Trail Bus Lines v. Martin,
JOO Ind. App. 206, 194 N. E. 862 (1935).
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should find (I) the entire amount due to plaintiff had there been no
contributory negligence, and ( 2) the degree of fault of each party
so that plaintiff should have judgment for so much of the total as was
proportionate to the degree of fault imputable to the defendant. The
trial court charged that the burden of proving contributory negligence
was upon the defendant, and the jury found the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence to a degree of ten per cent. On appeal, it was
argued that the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence rests upon the plaintiff under New York law and that, the question being one of procedure, the lex fori should apply. In affirming
the trial court, the court of appeals said: 67
"The Contributory Negligence Act of Ontario does more
than touch or affect a matter of procedure; it goes beyond directing who shall first proceed to prove that the act of the defendant
was solely responsible for the act or damage. The act gives a right
to recover not recognized by the common law. It: provides that
even if the plaintiff be guilty of contributory negligence, he may
yet recover, if the defendant were more negligent, the recovery,
however, being limited to the surplus degree of negligence, as
figured out by a jury. The law of the State of New York has no
application under such circumstances; it is impossible of application. As a mere matter of procedure, the plaintiff here must prove
his freedom from contributory negligence, but if in his proof he
fails to establish his freedom from contributory neglect or shows
that he was neglectful, his complaint must be dismissed. He has
no cause of action. . ..
"The appellant suggests that as this act does not refer to the
burden of proof, the plaintiff, under our form of procedure, should
have the burden of proving either freedom from contributing
negligence or else the degree to which his own negligence contributed. We have no such law in this State. To follow the appellant's suggestion would still require our courts to adopt a portion
of the Ontario Statute. If we are to adopt a part we must apply
it as a whole, because it affects the substantial rights of the parties."
The Supreme Court of Michigan has abandoned both logic and
precedent in an effort to accomplish desired social ends. It has held that
the measure of damages for breach of contract depends upon the lex
Jori, although the contract is made and performable in a foreign state.08
117

Id., 252 N. Y. at 134-135.
Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 84, 226 N. W. 883 (1929),
Wiest, J., dissenting; Mount Ida School v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N. W. 227
(1931).
118
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By the lex loci the plaintiff could recover substantial damages; by the
lex fori only nominal damages. "Realistically" speaking, enforcement
of the substantive right was refused. The true basis of decision was revealed when counsel argued that the rule of damages appertained to
substance. With "an intolerable affectation of superior virtue" 69 the
court intimated that, even so, the foreign damage rule in question was
contrary to the public policy of the forum, and so could not be countenanced.
In this connection it is interesting to consider the treatment of
sealed instruments in conflict of laws cases. In one case, a note executed
in Maryland, where it was regarded as a specialty, consideration being
conclusively presumed, was put in suit in Iowa. It was held that want
of consideration could be proved as a defense, since the question what
defenses may be pleaded is one of procedure and the lex f ori recognized
no distinction between sealed and unsealed contracts.70 This superficial
and mechanical application of the rule did not long go unchallenged.
The United States Supreme Court, in a leading case, declared that:
"The question of consideration, whether arising upon the admissibility of evidence or presented as a point in pleading, is not one of
procedure and remedy. It goes to the substance of the right itself,
and belongs to the constitution of the contract." 71
It may be argued, of course, that the result in the Iowa case is a
vicious consequence of the distinction between substance and procedure.
It seems a sufficient answer to this criticism to point out that no rule of
law affords protection against judicial ineptitude and that, in the particular case, the rule was merely invoked in support of a decision which
the court had resolved to make on grounds of "natural justice."
Another illustration of the eminently practical attitude of the
courts is Limerick National Bank v. Howard. 12 Action was brought in
New Hampshire upon a negotiable instrument executed and transferred by the payee in Vermont. The plaintiff claimed to be a holder
in due course and the issue was whether he had taken the instrument in
good faith. By the law of Vermont (lex loci contractus), a person tak69 The phrase is that of Justice Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights," 27 YALE L. J. 656 at 662 (1918).
70 Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa 251 (1869). 2 WHARTON, CoNFLICT OF LAws,
3d ed., § 789 (1905), takes the same position.
71 Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124 at 135, I S. Ct. 102 (1882). Accord:
Re Bonacina, [ l 9 I 2] 2 Ch. 394.
72 71 N. H. 13, 51 A. 641 (1901).
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ing an instrument under suspicious circumstances is deemed not to
have taken it in good faith, and the existence of suspicious circumstances
is determined by the jury. By the law of New Hampshire (lex fori),
actual notice is necessary to deprive a person of the standing of a bona
fide holder. There being no evidence of actual notice, the trial court
declined to submit the question of the holder's good faith to the jury
and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, this decision was
reversed, for the reason that an issue of substance was involved. The
essential question, stripped of its evidentiary garb was, under what
circumstances must a person take a negotiable instrument in order to
rank as a holder in due course? The law of Vermont said that the
transferee must act as a reasonably prudent man; the law of New
Hampshire said that want of good faith could only be shown by proof
of actual notice. The real matter in controversy was the legal effect
of the holder's conduct in Vermont, and the New Hampshire Court
properly declined to settle this by reference to the lex fori.
In fine, there is surprisingly little difference in result between the
existing precedents and Professor Cook's program. Both assume the
value, as a working rule, of the distinction between substance and procedure. Both insist that one must take account of the realities of the
particular case. Both decline to apply the rule logically when there are
strong countervailing factors of justice and policy. It would, I believe,
be impossible to show any serious miscarriage of justice that is directly
traceable to application of the distinction between substance and procedure. Professor Cook shows none; his principal destructive point
seems to be that the courts do not always practice what they preach,
and from this conclusion there can be no dissent.
V
CONCLUSION

How, then, should the cases be approached? It is submitted that,
as the ordinary rule of decision, the traditional method is the best one.
All procedural rules affect substantive rights; the question is one of
degree and, since this cannot practicably be debated in every case, the
orthodox distinction is valuable. It can be utilized just as lawyers make
a prima facie case: a certain judgment will ordinarily be given upon
the facts disclosed unless good cause to the contrary is shown or appears
to the court. 73 In the exceptional case in which a logical application of
73 This is apparently Professor Beale's thought when he observes that, "However
difficult it may be to define what these words mean, and however arbitrary and formal-
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the rule and our notions of policy collide, there is something to be
said for ignoring logic. But the abandonment of logic ab initio, which
some modern lawyers have proposed, will create more difficulties than
it solves. If we admit that the categories of substance and procedure are
not absolute, logic will do no harm. A legal system divorced from principles and standards must, in the long run, prove quite as obnoxious as
one which consists only of principles and standards. It is just as indefensible to ignore the constant factors in litigation as to ignore the
variable ones.
The question is not whether, as an original proposition, the realist
method is preferable to the traditional one, but rather, will the realist
approach produce results which are socially more desirable and, if so,
is it practicable to change our methodology after so many centuries?
By reference to the cases we see that the traditional approach does no
substantial injustice. In the hands of compete.nt judges, it rarely obscures the realities of a case; in the hands of incompetent judges, it is
idle to expect good results to fl.ow from any method. Again, we have
seen that for seven centuries our law has grown upon a substantiveprocedural framework. It would be an Augean task to extirpate this
distinction and a doubtful blessing even if that could be successfully
accomplished. 7¼ A difficult burden of proof rests upon him who would
change a practice and habit of .thought so deeply embedded in the
istic it may be so to classify legal principles, some foundation for a distinction between
them undoubtedly exists in practical judicial experience; and when other factors do not
demonstrate the correct result it would seem that a reference to this experience of the
judge is entirely proper." 3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 584.1 (1935).
Elsewhere in § 584.1 Professor Beale declares that, "there must be a balancing
of the interests of the parties, the court, and the respective states. If the practical convenience to the court in adopting the local rule of law is great, and the effect of so
doing upon the rights of the parties is negligible, the law of the forum will be held to
be controlling. If the situation is reversed the rule of the foreign law will be adopted."
If this is intended as a description of what usually happens in the decision of
a particular case of conflict of laws, it seems hardly accurate. If, on the other hand,
Professor Beale means that this ought to be the technique of decision, he out-Cooks
Cook and invites the criticism of Professor Horace E. Read in a book review in 49
HARV. L. REV. 346 at 349 ( I 93 5): "Can this be the whole story? Is the court in
a conflict of laws case to have no standard but the 'Chancellor's foot'?"
It may be doubted whether Professor Beale means to suggest that every case
should tum upon a judicial balancing of these factors of justice and convenience; his
point seems rather to be that the precedents declaring what is substantive and what is
procedural were influenced by these considerations.
74 Cf. Holmes "Law in Science and Science in Law," CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
210 at 239 (1920), reprinted from 12 HARV. L. REv. 443 at 460 (1899): "Indeed
precisely because I believe that the world would be just as well off if it lived under
laws that differed from ours in many ways, and because I believe that the claim of our
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law. So far as the distinction between substance and procedure is concerned, it is submitted that this burden of proof cannot be sustained
and that, in any event, the proposed change is outside the realm of
practical politics.
The more extreme realists also ignore the fact that certainty and
predictability are jural ends. Despite the insistence of these critics that
courts, no matter what they say, really exercise a discretion unregulated
by general principles, there remains a large degree of certainty in forecasting judicial action. This is true even in Continental courts, which,
following the tradition of the law of Rome, generally admit no obligation to adhere to their previous decisions or to those of superior courts. 75
A frank decision of every case upon its supposed merits, without regard
to rules or precedents and limited only by considerations of policy-the
freirechtsfindung of Continental jurists-is a possible way of judicial
life. But it is radically inconsistent with our legal system and open to
grave practical objections. In certain branches of the law a high degree
of predictability is essential to social order. 76 To purchase certainty at
the expense of justice would be vicious, but in the field under consideration some degree of certainty is not incompatible with justice and
is, in truth, a condition of justice. The new scepticism affords no guidance to a busy judge.
This brings us to the practical need of resolving cases of conflict of
laws into their substantive and procedural elements. Story's justification of the distinction now sounds rather provincial:
especial code to respect is simply that it exists, that it is the one to which we have
become accustomed, and not that it represents an eternal principle, I am slow to consent to overruling a precedent and think that our important duty is to see that the
judicial duel shall be fought out in the accustomed way." Cf. Durfee, "Broadening
Legal Education," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 206 at 220, note 24 (1932): "At times one
feels so keenly the dangers lurking in the distinction between substantive law and procedure that he would consign it to oblivion. Yet it has considerable convenience and,
even if it did not, it would be difficult to eradicate from lawyers' thinking."
75
BucKLAND, TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN LAw 633-634 (1921); ALLEN, LAw IN THE
MAKING 121 (1927) [3d ed., 172 (1939)].
16 PouND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 140-143 (1922) and
Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 HARv. L. REv. 802 at 825 (1923).
This view is assailed by FRANK, LAW AND THE MoDERN MIND (1930), and successfully defended by Professor Rottschaefer in a review in 44 HARV. L. REv. 481 at 483
( I 93 I), wherein he observed, "The criticism of Dean Pound is directed largely at the
latter's division of the field of law into that in which certainty is socially desirable and
that in which fluidity is the preferable policy. The criticism amounts to little more than
indicating that the division can not be drawn with complete logical precision and consistency. Such criticism could be made of any classification••••" Cf. McClintock, "Dis-
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"There is no hardship or injustice in refusing to foreigners
remedies which do not belong to the genius of the government
or its laws, or to repel proceedings or process from its courts,
which it does not choose to entertain in cases of domestic litigation." 11
And there is a little too much of quod erat demonstrandum in Lord
Tenterden's famous remark:
"A person suing in this country must take the law as he finds
it," 78
the proper rejoinder being-"True, but how does he find the law?"
It is preferable to rest the distinction upon the low practical ground
that, without it, judicial business could hardly continue. In the first
place, it should be observed that in cases of conflict of laws there is
normally only one question of substance ( e.g., is there a tort or a valid
contract or conveyance), while there are invariably dozens of questions
of procedure. It is one thing to admit proof of foreign law to establish
a tort, a contract or a conveyance; it is quite another to investigate the
foreign law on every one of the multitude of points regarding summonses, affidavits, attachments, pleadings, trials, evidence, executions
and costs which will arise. 79 This argument applies a fortiori where the
foreign rule sought to be proved is that of a remote state whose legal
system may be so different from that of the forum as to be quite unintelligible without prolonged study. One need not dwell upon the
hypothetical horrors of ascertaining the rules of evidence if any, which
prevail in Mongolia or Afghanistan. Such a comparatively simple question as the effect of the French statute of limitations recently caused an
exceptionally competent United States Circuit Court of Appeals much
anxiety and doubt. 80
It is probably a tacit recognition of these factors which leads Engtinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 78 UN1v. PA. L. REv.
933 at 939 (1930).
11 LeRoy v. Crowninshield, (C. C. Mass. 1820) 2 Mason 151 at 158, 15 F. Cas.
No. 8,269.
78
De la Vega v. Vianna, l B. & Ad. 284 at 288, 109 Eng. Rep. 792 (1830).
79
Professor Cook, " 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42
YALE L. J. 333 at 346 (1933), appears to overlook this point in arguing that, "it is
generally no more difficult to know the foreign rule as to burden of proof than it is
to know the foreign 'substantive' law." There is, of course, much more variation from
state to state in procedure than in substantive law for the reason that procedure is
usually arbitrary, while the substantive law reflects the mores of the community. Cf.
STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws 128 (1937); GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed.,
§ 77 (1938); 3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 584.1 (1935).
80
Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C. C. A. 2d, 1930)
43 F. (2d) 941 (Learned Hand, J.).
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lish courts, whenever possible, to presume that the parties intended
English law to fix their substantive rights. Courts have a preference
for their own law-a preference which is not hard to understand. Lawyers have the same attitude. There must be thousands of cases decided
every year which contain "foreign elements," but in which no foreign
law is proved. Ignorance, inertia and fear of technical pitfalls in getting
the foreign law properly before a court doubtless explain this fact. In
these circumstances, our courts often follow the line of least resistance
and presume that the foreign law, although not proved, is the same as
the lex fori. 81 It is difficult to believe that any lawyer of much experience
in the courts would deem practicable a greatly increased reception of
foreign law. And every lawyer who must advise clients should be able
to discover, with reasonable certainty, how much foreign law he will
need or how much foreign law may be used against him. Chaos will
follow an attempt to make this a matter of judicial discretion in every
case.
Another argument for the distinction which cannot be ignored lies
in the impossibility of securing agreement upon the public policy behind rules of law. All writers, even the most latitudinarian, agree that
the reception of foreign law must cease at the point where the policy
of the forum would be outraged. Clearly, we are not going to allow
trial by battle or the pound of flesh. Where shall the line be drawn?
When is the foreign rule invoked so contra bonos mores that the forum,
in defense of its own virtue, must reject it? Such questions promote
hopeless controversy-hopeless because fundamental issues are often
at stake. "The unruly horse of public policy" is a figure born of experience in common-law courts, while the vast Continental literature
on l' ordre public points equally to the wisdom of avoiding this question
whenever possible.
As an example of this difficulty, the Supreme Court of Michigan
has intimated that the Massachusetts rule of damages for breach of
contract violates the policy of the forum. 82 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of California, with expansive enthusiasm, has applied
the local legitimation act to all comers on grounds of policy, the act
being described as "manna to the bastards of the world." 83 Such results
tempt one to embrace the behaviouristic method of interpreting judicial
decisions. They certainly indicate the futility of expecting any consensus of opinion. From one standpoint, all statutes declare the policy
81

GooDRICH, CoNFLICT oFLAws, 2d ed., 195-197 (1938).
Mount Ida School v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N. W. 227 (1931).
88
Blythe v. Ayers, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892).
82
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of the forum and a contrary rule therefore offends it. Through this
confusion, the orthodox distinction of substance and procedure offers
a guiding hand and a convenient working rule. It is much easier to
secure agreement as to what is logical than as to what is wise or just.
It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that abrogation
of the lawyer's distinction between substance and procedure will destroy
such consistency and predictability as we now have without giving an
equivalent return. It will necessarily hamper and delay the administration of justice and it will greatly increase the number of highly controversial questions of social policy. We return to Professor Cook's
question: "How far can the court of the forum go in applying the
rules taken from the foreign system of law without unduly burdening
or inconveniencing itself?" The answer, it is believed, should be: "Not
much farther than we have already gone." It may be doubted whether
the realists who would go farther are sufficiently realistic.
As a final word, I shall quote from two distinguished philosophers
whose remarks seem applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the question in
hand. Professor Alfred North Whitehead has written:
"There are two principles inherent in the very nature of
things, recurring in some particular embodiments whatever field
we explore-the spirit of change, and the spirit of conservation.
There can be nothing real without both. Mere change without
conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing. Its final inte. gration yields mere transient non-entity. Mere conservation without change cannot conserve." 8 4,
And the late Professor Irving Babbitt observed:
"In getting his standards the humanist of the best type is not content to acquiesce inertly in tradition. He is aware that there is
always entering into life an element of vital novelty and that the
wisdom of the past, invaluable though it is, cannot therefore be
brought to bear too literally on the present. He knows that,
though standards are necessary, they should be held flexibly and
that, to accomplish this feat, he must make the most difficult of all
mediations, that between the One and the Many. The chief enemies of the humanist are the pragmatists and other philosophers
of the flux who simplify this problem for themselves by dismissing
the One, which is actually a living intuition, as a metaphysical
abstraction." 85
84,WHITEHEAD, ScIENCE AND THE MoDERN WoRLD 289 (1925).
Babbitt, "Humanism: An Essay at Definition," in HUMANISM AND AMERICA 25
at 42 (1930).
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